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Abstract: The law of the European Union confers subjective rights on citizens, such as 
those they derive – in their role of consumers – from the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive (93/13/EEC). Civil courts play a key role in the enforcement and protection of 
those rights. Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) safeguards 
the right to an effective remedy before a court of law for infringements of substantive 
EU rights. It may entail a change in perspective towards the autonomy of the Member 
States as regards remedies, procedures and, in particular, judicial protection under the 
Directive. It provides civil courts with an instrument for the assessment, (consistent) 
interpretation and (dis)application of both contractual clauses and procedural rules 
governing disputes between consumers and their professional counterparties.  
The ‘proceduralized constitutionalization’ of consumer protection can be illustrated by 
the example of arbitration clauses, which are regulated differently in the EU Member 
States. In the Netherlands, (online) arbitration in consumer cases has given rise to a 
debate about the lack of judicial control over commercial ‘adjudication’. This will be 
discussed in light of the case law of the EU Court of Justice concerning unfair terms 
control and access to court – e.g. Asturcom (C-40/08) and, more recently, Menini (C-
75/16) – as well as the groundbreaking decision in Achmea (C-284/16). The aim is to 
examine the function of Article 47 EUCFR at EU level and at the national level with 
respect to consumer arbitration and with a focus on the Netherlands and Spain. The 
Spanish experience can inform Dutch civil courts on how to deal with this issue. 
Title: Article 47 EUCFR and civil courts: the case of arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts (the Netherlands vs Spain) 
Keywords: Directive 93/13/EEC; unfair terms in consumer contracts; civil jurisdiction; 
Article 47 EUCFR; effective judicial protection; arbitration clauses 
Resumen: El Derecho de la Unión Europea confiere derechos subjetivos a los 
ciudadanos, como los que derivan – en su cualidad de consumidores – de la Directiva 
sobre las cláusulas abusivas (93/13/CEE). Los tribunales del orden civil ejercen un papel 
clave en la aplicación y protección de estos derechos. El artículo 47 de la Carta de los 
Derechos Fundamentales de la UE (CDFUE) protege el derecho a la tutela judicial 
efectiva frente a infracciones del Derecho material de la UE. Este precepto puede 
suponer un cambio de perspectiva en la que se refiere a la autonomía de los Estados 
miembros en relación con los remedios, los procedimientos y, en particular, la tutela 
judicial de los que gozan las consumidores con arreglo a la Directiva. La norma 
proporciona a los tribunales civiles un instrumento para la evaluación, la interpretación 
(coherente) y la (des)aplicación tanto de las cláusulas contractuales como de las 
normas procesales que rigen los litigios entre los consumidores y los profesionales. 
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La "constitucionalización procesalizada" de la protección del consumidor puede 
ilustrarse mediante el ejemplo de las cláusulas de arbitraje, que están reguladas de 
manera diferente en los Estados miembros de la UE. En los Países Bajos, la resolución 
privada de conflictos mediante el arbitraje (en línea) en casos de consumo ha dado 
lugar a un debate sobre la posible mercantilización del sistema, atendida la falta de 
control judicial de las decisiones del árbitro. Ello se analizará a la luz de la 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la UE sobre el control de las cláusulas 
abusivas y el acceso a los tribunales – por ejemplo, Asturcom (C-40/08) y, más 
recientemente, Menini (C-75/16) – así como la decisión innovadora en Achmea (C-
284/16). El objetivo es examinar la función del artículo 47 CDFUE en la UE y a nivel 
nacional con respecto al arbitraje de consumo, con particular atención a los Países 
Bajos y España. La experiencia española puede ilustrar a los tribunales civiles 
holandeses sobre la manera de tratar este problema. 
Title: Artículo 47 CDFUE y jurisdicción civil: el asunto de cláusulas de arbitraje y los 
contratos celebrados con los consumidores (Países Bajos v. España) 
Palabras clave: Directiva 93/13/CEE; cláusulas abusivas en los contratos celebrados 
con los consumidores; jurisdicción civil; Artículo 47 CDFUE; tutela judicial efectiva; 
cláusulas de arbitraje  
 
 
* This paper was presented at the colloquium ‘Derecho de los particulares y Derecho privado 
europeo’, organized by the Càtedra Jean Monnet en dret privat europeu at the Universitat de 
Barcelona on 20 April 2018. I would like to thank Dra. Esther Arroyo Amayuelas for the 
opportunity to participate in this colloquium, and for the valuable questions and comments 
from her and her colleagues.   
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1. Introduction 
In 2008, the Spanish government believed that Spain was among the national legal 
systems that offered the strongest protection to consumers in respect of (legislative) 
safeguards against unfair contract terms.1 At the time, there had been only three 
Spanish cases before the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) on Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts (Unfair Contract Terms Directive, or UCTD).2 The Spanish 
government might have been right from a substantive point of view,3 but from a 
procedural perspective it appears to have been mistaken. Over the next ten years 
(2008-2018), the CJEU held on various occasions that Spanish procedural law did not 
offer sufficient protection to consumers.4 One of the first cases in which Spanish 
procedural rules were questioned in the light of the UCTD was Asturcom (2009),5 
which concerned the limited scope for review by civil courts of arbitral awards 
rendered against consumers. The case demonstrates the tension between alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR; including arbitration), effective judicial protection of 
consumers under the UCTD and the procedural autonomy of the Member States in this 
respect. Almost ten year later, Dutch courts are confronted with a similar issue as the 
one in Asturcom, which will be discussed in this paper (see section 2 below). The 
Spanish experience can inform Dutch civil courts on how to deal with this issue.  
The UCTD provides only for minimum harmonization. The Member States must ensure 
that unfair terms are not binding on consumers and that adequate and effective 
means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms (Articles 6 and 7 UCTD). 
However, the UCTD does not contain any detailed procedural rules, e.g. as to the 
enforcement of contractual claims. The Member States have procedural autonomy to 
regulate the legal remedies and procedures governing actions pertaining to the rights 
individuals derive from the UCTD.6 In practice, the applicable rules vary considerably 
across national legal systems. Thus, consumers enjoy a different level of protection 
under Spanish law than, for instance, Dutch law.7 Under Spanish law (as of 2007), 
                                                          
1  Written observations of the Kingdom of Spain, submitted to the CJEU in Case C-40/08 Asturcom on 11 August 
2008 (Observaciones del Reino de España en el asunto C-40/08 Asturcom; not published).  
2  Case C-240/98 Océano Grupo Editorial v Murciano Quintero ECLI:EU:C:200:346 (2000); Case C-70/03 
Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:2004:505 (2004); Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:675 (2006).  
3  See e.g. Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros v Ausbanc ECLI:EU:C:2010:309. 
4  See e.g. Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito v Calderón Camino ECLI:EU:C:2012:349 (2012), Case C-415/11 
Aziz v Catalunyacaixa ECLI:EU:C:2013:164 (2013); CASE C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo v BBVA ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099 
(2014).  
5  Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones v Rogríguez Noguiera ECLI:EU:C:2009:615. 
6  See e.g. Case C-473/00 Cofidis v Fredout ECLI:EU:2002:705, para 28; Case C-147/16 Karel de Grote-Hogeschool v 
Kuijpers ECLI:EU:C:2018:320, para 33.  
7  For the purpose of this paper, only domestic disputes will be covered. As regards the applicable law and 
jurisdiction in cross-border disputes, see e.g. Case C-191/15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU, 
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arbitration clauses in consumer contracts concluded before a dispute has arisen are in 
principle considered to be not binding.8 The reason for this is that consumers have a 
weaker position vis-à-vis their professional counterparties (i.e. traders) and should not 
be forced to waive the rights afforded to them by law; they cannot properly evaluate 
upfront whether they want to go to arbitration or to court.9 In the Netherlands, by 
comparison, arbitration clauses in standard terms and conditions were not generally 
considered as unfair until 2015, and there is still an ‘escape’ (as we will see in section 
2).  
While the Member States can to a certain extent decide whether and under which 
conditions e.g. arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are allowed,10  their 
procedural autonomy is not unlimited. Today, the most preliminary references to the 
CJEU regarding the UCTD originate from Spain, many of which relate to procedural 
issues that have come to light in the wake of the financial crisis.11 In response, the 
CJEU has developed a body of case law on national remedies and procedures under 
the UCTD.12 The ‘proceduralization’ of the UCTD13 proves that the harmonization of 
rights at the EU level and the protection of those rights at the national level are 
inextricably linked. Indeed, consumer rights are only as effective as their 
enforcement.14 There is a connection between substantive and procedural consumer 
protection. According to the CJEU, there is a real risk that consumers are unaware of 
their rights or deterred from enforcing them on account of legal costs or other 
procedural obstacles.15 Often, consumers are the defendant, which means their legal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ECLI:EU:C:2016:612 respectively Case C-498/16 Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:37.  
8  Articles 57.4 and 90.1 of the texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios 
(TR-LGDCU; General Act for the Defence of Consumers and Users).  
9  Ley 44/2006, de 29 de diciembre de mejora de la protección de los consumidores y usuarios, Boletín Oficial del 
Estado (BOE) No. 312 of 30 December 2006, 44601, Preamble VII.  
10  Article 1(q) of the Annex to the UCTD, which contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms that may be 
regarded as unfair, refers to terms “excluding the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other 
legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by 
legal provisions”.  
11  See further e.g. Fernando Gómez Pomar and Karolina Lyczkowska, ‘Spanish Courts, the European Court and 
Consumer Law: Some Thoughts on Their Interaction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Stephanie Law (eds), Judicial 
Cooperation in European Private Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017); Maribel González Pascual, ‘Social Rights 
Protection and Financial Crisis in Europe. The Right to Housing, a Cautionary Tale’ (2016) 9 Inter-American and 
European Human Rights Journal 260; Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Unfair Terms in Mortgage Loans and Protection of 
Housing in Times of Economic Crisis: Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 955. 
12  See further e.g. Hans-W Micklitz and Norbert Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 771. 
13  Federico Della Negra, ‘The Uncertain Development of the Case Law on Consumer Protection in Mortgage 
Enforcement Proceedings: Sánchez Morcillo and Kušionová’ (2015) 52 1009, 1010; Iris Benöhr, EU Consumer 
Law and Human Rights (First edition, Oxford University Press 2013) 14. 
14  Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (Aldershot 2005) 660.  
15  See e.g. Mostaza Claro, para 28; Océano, para 26; Karel de Grote-Hogeschool, para 32. See also Mónika Józon, 
‘Unfair Contract Terms Law in Europe in Times of Crisis: Substantive Justice Lost in the Paradise of 
Proceduralisation of Contract Fairness’ [2017] Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 157, 162. 
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position will be affected whether they participate in the proceedings or not.16 This is 
why effective judicial protection is especially important in the area of EU consumer law 
and unfair terms control.  
This paper aims to explore the impact of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EUCFR) – which guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court of 
law for infringements of EU rights17 – on national civil procedure, in the context of the 
UCTD. Arbitration clauses will be taken as an example, because they reveal the 
different considerations and potentially conflicting interests at stake. At the level of 
the parties, there is the interest of the creditor in a swift debt recovery and in having 
access to efficient procedures, the (substantive) right of the consumer-debtor to be 
protected against unfair terms as well as the (procedural) right of access to court and 
other procedural safeguards, e.g. the right to be heard.18 EU law appears to protect 
both substantive and procedural rights under the UCTD, read in conjunction with 
Article 47 EUCFR. At the same time, the CJEU has shown some deference to the 
Member States in procedural matters, like in Asturcom (see section 3 below). Whereas 
the CJEU decided the case on the basis of the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, Advocate General (AG) Trstenjak had referred to Article 47 EUCFR – 
which entered into force on 1 December 2009, two months after the CJEU’s judgment 
– and arrived at a distinct conclusion.19 The diverging approaches of the CJEU and the 
AG will be discussed in this paper.  
More recent case law – in particular, Menini (2017) and Achmea (2018)20 – indicates 
that Article 47 EUCFR may entail a change in perspective (see section 4).21 It reinforces 
the mandate of courts, which must uphold the subjective rights EU law confers on 
citizens (in their role of consumers), also in private law adjudication.22 The CJEU has 
                                                          
16  Case C-147/16 Karel de Grote-Hogeschool v Kuijpers, Opinion of AG Sharpston ECLI:EU:C:2017:928, point 32. 
17  Article 47 EUCFR reads: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and 
represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to 
ensure effective access to justice.”  
18  See e.g. Case C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank v Csaba Csipai ECLI:EU:C:2013:88, para 29.  
19  Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones v Rodríguez Nogueira, Opinion of AG Trstenjak ECLI:EU:C:2009:305.  
20  Case C-75/16 Menini and Rampanelli v Banco Popolare Società Cooperative ECLI:EU:C2017:457; Case C-284/16 
Slovak Republic v Achmea ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.  
21  See also Anna Van Duin, ‘Metamorphosis? The Role of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
Cases Concerning National Remedies and Procedures under Directive 93/13/EEC’ [2017] Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law 190. 
22  Hugh Collins, ‘The Revolutionary Trajectory of EU Contract Law towards Post-National Law’, 
Revolution and Evolution in Private Law (Hart Publishing 2018) 327. See also Hans-W Micklitz, ‘The ECJ 
between the Individual Citizen and the Member States: A Plea for a Judge-Made European Law on 
Remedies’ in HW Micklitz and B De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the 
Member States (Intersentia 2012) 363. 
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recently confirmed that Article 47 EUCFR is sufficient in itself to confer a right on 
individuals on which they may rely in disputes between them (i.e. ‘horizontal’ legal 
relationships) in a field covered by EU law.23 Consequently, national civil courts must 
ensure the effective judicial protection of individuals and guarantee the full 
effectiveness of Article 47 EUCFR by disapplying (if necessary) any contrary provision of 
national law. The Dutch experience will be discussed against the background of 
Spanish law in order to illustrate how, despite disparities between national legal 
systems, Article 47 EUCFR may operate as an ‘EU standard’ to remove obstacles and fill 
gaps in the procedural framework for consumer protection.  
2. Example from the Netherlands: e-Court 
In civil litigation (and arbitration), there is always a tension between the claimant’s 
right of access to justice and the defendant’s rights of the defence, which are both 
protected by Article 47 EUCFR.24 Cases falling within the scope of the UCTD are 
characterized by a contractual imbalance between the parties, accentuated by a 
procedural inequality which may increase as there are more procedural obstacles or 
restrictions.25 Therefore, the procedural position of the consumer matters: is she the 
claimant or the defendant, and in what type of proceedings? What are the instruments 
available to her, e.g. how and on what grounds can she challenge an (allegedly unfair) 
arbitration clause? And when should the court be able to step in, e.g. by refusing to 
enforce an arbitral award against a consumer? These modalities are primarily 
determined by national procedural law, which plays a decisive role in the effective 
judicial protection of consumers under the UCTD.  
In Spain, only consumers have access to arbitration to bring their claims, not traders. 
There is a special Sistema Arbitral del Consumo (consumer arbitration system), which is 
regulated by law.26 Consumers can choose to go to court or to the Sistema Arbitral del 
Consumo. They can, in principle, not be subjected to arbitration as a defendant.27 This 
                                                          
23  Case C-414/16 Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, para 78.  
24  See e.g. Case C-327/10 Hypoteční banka v Lindner ECLI:EU:C:2011:745, para. 46.  
25  Cf. Sánchez Morcillo (2014), paras 22-24 and paras 46-48.  
26  Real Decreto 636/1993, de 3 de mayo, por el que se regula el sistema arbitral de consumo, BOE No. 121 of 21 
May 1993, 15400; Real Decreto 231/2008, de 15 de febrero, por el que se regula el Sistema Arbitral de Consumo, 
BOE No. 48 of 25 February 2008, 11072. See further Ma Teresa Álvarez Moreno, ‘Resolución Alternativa de 
Litigios Con Consumidores y Arbitraje de Consumo’ in Silvia Díaz Alabart (ed), Manual de Derecho de consumo 
(Editorial Reus 2016). The submission of disputes to arbitration other than consumer arbitration is considered to 
be an unfair term, except in the case of arbitration bodies established by statutory provision in respect of 
specific sectors or circumstances (Article 90.1 TR-LGDCU). 
27  Cf. Tribunal Constitucional, decision No. 1/2018 of 11 January 2018, ECLI:ES:TC:2018:1. For further background 
on the consumer ADR scheme in Spain, see Pablo Cortés, ‘The Impact of EU Law in the ADR Landscape in Italy, 
Spain and the UK: Time for Change or Missed Opportunity?’ (2015) 16 ERA Forum 125, 133ff. 
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is different in the Netherlands, where ADR is to a large extent self-regulated28 and 
arbitration is used as a mechanism to enforce claims against consumers as well. This 
has recently provoked a debate on consumer arbitration via a private foundation 
called ‘e-Court’.29 E-Court is an online platform that presents itself as an easier, faster 
and cheaper alternative to the judicial system, with lower fees and a completely digital 
procedure.30 As it turned out, e-Court was mostly used by professional parties who 
brought claims against consumer-debtors on a large scale; through e-Court they were 
able to quickly obtain arbitral awards granting their claims. However, multiple aspects 
of e-Court’s mode of operation were arguably problematic from the perspective of 
consumer protection. Most consumers had no idea they had given their ‘consent’ to 
arbitration when they signed the contract with the creditor. The time limit for the 
consumer to submit a defence was very short (approximately 1 week). If no defence 
was submitted, a standardized decision would be automatically generated, which 
simply referred to the case file for the claimed amount and other case-specific 
information. Furthermore, it was doubtful whether unfair terms control (including the 
arbitration clause) had taken place. Thus, arbitral awards rendered by e-Court were 
potentially based on invalid arbitration clauses and granted claims could encompass 
unfair terms regarding e.g. interest and costs. There were also concerns as to e-Court’s 
independence – its business model was based on large numbers of cases brought by 
the same creditors – and transparency; its decisions were not published and the names 
of its arbiters undisclosed. In addition, the scope for judicial review of arbitral awards 
is limited.31  
In the Netherlands, arbitration clauses are on the ‘black list’ of unfair standard terms 
and conditions in consumer contracts since 2015.32 This means that such clauses are 
                                                          
28  See also An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their impact on the free 
circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumers 
under EU consumer law. Strand 2: Procedural Protection of Consumers, Report prepared by a Consortium of 
European universities led by the Pax Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law as commissioned by the 
European Commission (JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082), published 26 January 2018 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49503), 82. 
29  For the following paragraph, the main source has been an article published (in Dutch) by investigative 
journalists Karlijn Kuijpers, Thomans Muntz and Tim Staal, ‘Vonnis te koop’, (2018) 3 De Groene Amsterdammer, 
28,  available at https://www.groene.nl/artikel/vonnis-te-koop. For more background (in Dutch), 
see Anna van Duin, ‘E-Court en ‘robotrechtspraak’: efficiëntie ten koste van rechtsbescherming’, (2018) Sdu-
blog https://www.sdu.nl/blog/e-court-en-robotrechtspraak-efficientie-ten-koste-van-
rechtsbescherming.html.  
30  See www.e-court.nl (last consulted on 25 May 2018).  
31  Articles 1063.3 and 1065.1 Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Rv; Code of Civil Procedure).  
32  Article 6:236(n) Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW; Civil Code), which reads, in English translation 
(http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook066.htm): “The following stipulations in the 
applicable standard terms and conditions are deemed to be unreasonably burdensome for [consumers]: (…) n. a 
stipulation which provides for the settlement of a dispute other than by a court with jurisdiction pursuant to 
law, unless it still allows the [consumer] to choose for a settlement of the dispute by the court with jurisdiction 
pursuant to law and this choice can be made within a period of at least one month after the [trader] has 
invoked the stipulation in writing.”  
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deemed as unfair, unless consumers are given a period of one month from the 
moment an arbitration clause is invoked against them to decide whether they prefer to 
go to court instead. The main reason for ‘blacklisting’ arbitration clauses is that 
otherwise, consumers could be deprived – without being aware of it or against their 
will – of the protection of the courts assigned to them by law.33 The ‘escape’ of a one-
month period distinguishes the Dutch provision from its Spanish counterpart: if the 
consumer does not object within this period, the arbitration clause is, in principle, 
valid. In the case of e-Court, it appeared that this one-month period was not always 
taken into account. And even when the consumer had objected to arbitration, arbitral 
awards were still rendered sometimes.34 It was also questionable whether consumers 
were sufficiently informed of the difference between arbitration and ordinary court 
proceedings in the first place, so they could make a well-considered choice.35  
Article 47 EUCFR may have played an indirect role in the legislative change of 2015. 
The Dutch legislator referred to a case in which a Dutch court had held that arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts were unfair because they run counter to Article 47 
EUCFR.36 Arbitration may have disadvantages for consumers compared to courts; the 
proceedings are not governed by the same safeguards. The Dutch Supreme Court 
nevertheless quashed the judgment, because the individual circumstances of the case 
should have been taken into account instead of an ‘objective’ argumentation that was 
applicable to all arbitration clauses.37 Yet, the case demonstrated that arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts were controversial. In 2017, another Dutch court put 
the emphasis on a potential lack of consent rather than procedural safeguards, but in 
the end it found that in the circumstances of the case the arbitration clause at issue 
was not unfair.38 This raises the question how Article 47 EUCFR relates to consumer 
arbitration (before and after 2015) in the context of unfair terms control: does it 
impose certain procedural guarantees and/or does it (also) entail stricter requirements 
as to consent (e.g. a waiver of the right of access to court must be interpreted 
restrictively39)? The answer seems to be that it can do both, although procedural rights 
are not absolute (see further section 4 below) and ‘consent’ is appraised slightly 
differently in Dutch law than in Spanish law. A follow-up question would be: what if it 
is doubtful whether the court has the power to examine whether these requirements 
have been observed? Can Article 47 EUCFR be used as a basis to provide an effective 
judicial remedy (see further section 3 below)? 
                                                          
33  Kamerstukken (Parliamentary Papers) II, 2012/2013, 33 611, nr. 3, p. 7.  
34  See e.g. Rechtbank Amsterdam 30 January 2018, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:419. 
35  Cf. Case C-342/13 Sebestyén v OTP Bank ECLI:EU:C:2014:1857, para 36. 
36  Gerechtshof Leeuwarden 5 July 2011, ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2011:BR2500 (Van Marrum/Wolff). 
37  Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), judgment of 21 September 2012, ECLI:NL:2012:BW6135.  
38  Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 11 July 2017, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2017:5961 (Pharma Slovakia C.V.)  
39  See e.g. Rechtbank Almelo 7 October 2011, ECLI:NL:RBALM:2011:BT7088. Cf. MW Knigge and PLF Ribbers, 
‘Arbitrage, Afstand van Recht En Artikel 6 EVRM’ (2017) 20 Tijdschrift voor Arbitrage 35. 
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There are three situations in which a civil court may have to assess the (un)fairness or 
(in)validity of an arbitration clause: (i) the defendant invokes the clause to argue that 
the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim, (ii) an action for annulment of 
an arbitral award is brought, or (iii) the court is requested to grant leave for the 
enforcement of an arbitral award. Both Dutch cases referred to in this section 
concerned the first situation, which is in itself not problematic from the perspective of 
Article 47 EUCFR because it involves judicial control ex ante. In the case of e-Court, it is 
mostly the third situation, i.e. after the arbitral award has been rendered, where there 
is only limited space for judicial control. If no action for annulment is brought within 
three months, the award becomes final and its enforcement can only be refused when 
the arbitral proceedings or the award itself are prima facie contrary to public policy.40 
This could, for instance, be the case when the claimed amount is not specified in the 
award, so debtors do not know exactly how much they have to pay.41 It could also be 
said that this is the case when the above-mentioned one-month period has not been 
observed and/or the right to be heard has been violated, e.g. the consumer has not 
had the opportunity to properly prepare a defence; 1 week is exceptionally short.42 
However, it is unclear how the court is supposed to determine this: it normally 
receives only the arbitral award that is to be enforced and does not carry out an 
elaborate examination. Leave for enforcement is usually granted ex parte, i.e. without 
hearing the other party (the consumer). This means that the court will not have 
information about irregularities in the course of the proceedings, if any. Does Article 
47 EUCFR, read in conjunction with the UCTD, require more of national courts in this 
respect?  
3. Asturcom: guidance from EU law?  
Asturcom concerned the enforcement of an arbitral award that was based on a 
presumably unfair arbitration clause in a contract between a Spanish mobile telephone 
company and a consumer. The court that was asked to enforce the award against the 
consumer-debtor observed in its preliminary reference that the clause at issue caused 
a significant imbalance between the parties and impaired the consumer’s right of 
access to court and rights of the defence.43 The clause had been drafted by the 
arbitration institute itself, 44 which cast doubt as to its impartiality and independence. 
Moreover, the seat of the arbitral tribunal was not indicated in the contract; it was 
located at a considerable distance from the consumer’s place of residence and the 
                                                          
40  Article 1063.2 Rv.  
41  Rechtbank Amsterdam 27 March 2017, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:2427.  
42  Cf. Case C-176/17 Profi Credit Polska v Warwzosek, Opinion of AG Kokott ECLI:EU:C:2018:293, point 79.  
43  Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 4 de Bilbao, order No. 1147/07 of 4 December 2007 (not published).  
44  In this case, the Asociación Europea de Arbitraje de Derecho y Equidad (AEADE).  
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costs almost exceeded the claimed amount. The arbitral award was rendered in 
default of appearance of the consumer, who did not bring an action for annulment and 
did not oppose the enforcement either. Thus, the award had become final, with res 
judicata effect.45 In Spain, arbitral awards enjoy the same status as judicial decisions 
for the purpose of enforcement; the scope of judicial review is restricted to a 
formalities check.46 Still, some Spanish courts considered it possible to refuse to 
enforce the arbitral award when it was based on an unfair arbitration clause within the 
meaning of the UCTD; others assessed whether the award itself was contrary to public 
policy, e.g. because of a lack of impartiality of the arbitral tribunal.47 These were judge-
made solutions with no express statutory basis. There were also courts that found the 
unfairness of an arbitration clause could only be established at the request of the 
consumer in (a) an action for annulment or (b) opposition against enforcement; ex 
officio control would go against legal certainty and the principle of res judicata.48 The 
referring court in Asturcom seems to have questioned the latter approach (of its own 
Court of Appeal). The Spanish legislator did not clear the doubt until 2015, when the 
possibility of ex officio control of unfair terms was introduced at the enforcement 
stage, with explicit reference to Asturcom.49  
In Asturcom, the CJEU held that when a national court is asked to enforce a final 
arbitral award, it must only assess ex officio whether the arbitration clause is unfair in 
the light of the UCTD if national rules of procedure require such an assessment under 
domestic rules of public policy,50 and where the court has available to it the legal and 
factual elements necessary for that task.51 In the Netherlands, an invalid arbitration 
agreement (e.g. because of an unfair arbitration clause and/or due to a lack of 
consent) is, strictly speaking, a different ground than the arbitral proceedings or the 
award being contrary to public policy.52 In Spain, a similar distinction – between public 
policy and other grounds –  applies in actions for annulment of arbitral awards, but not 
at the enforcement stage.53 Thus, the principle of equivalence did not necessarily help 
                                                          
45  Article 43 Ley de Arbitraje (LA; Arbitration Act).  
46  Article 517.2.2° Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC; Code of Civil Procedure) respectively Articles 551 and 552 LEC; 
cf. Articles 556 and 559 LEC. 
47  María García-Valdecasas Dorrego, Dialogue between the Spanish Courts and the European Court of Justice 
Regarding the Judicial Protection of Consumers under Directive 93/13/EEC (Fundación Registral 2018) 47. 
48  See e.g. Audiencia Provincial de Bilbao, order No. 396/08 of 6 June 2008 (not published).  
49  Ley 42/2015, de 5 octubre, de reforma de la Ley 1/2000, de 7 enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil, BOE No. 239, 
6 October 2015, 90240 (Disposición transitoria segunda: Procesos monitorios y ejecución de laudos arbitrales). 
See further Arroyo Amayuelas (n 12) 79–80.  
50  Article 6 UCTD must be regarded as a provision of equal standing to domestic rules of public policy: see e.g. 
Case C-243/08 Pannon v Sustikné Győrfi ECLI:EU:C:2009:350, para 32; Asturcom, paras 51-52; Case C-421/14 
Banco Primus v Gutiérrez García ECLI:EU:C:2017:60, para 42.  
51  Asturcom, paras 53 and 59.  
52  See further Alain Ancery, Ambtshalve Toepassing van EU-Recht (Kluwer 2012) 192.  
53  Article 41.1 LA.  
Anna van Duin  Working paper 5/2018 
13 
 
the consumer-debtor here.54 According to the CJEU, the need to comply with the 
principle of effectiveness cannot be stretched so far as to mean that the national court 
should make up fully for “total inertia” on the part of the consumer, who had been 
notified of both the arbitration proceedings and the arbitral award of which the 
enforcement was sought. A time-limit of two months to bring an action for annulment 
did not make it “virtually impossible or excessively difficult” for the consumer to 
exercise her rights.55 It is compatible with EU law to establish reasonable time-limits in 
the interest of legal certainty.56 National courts are not obliged to refrain from 
applying procedural rules conferring finality (res judicata effect) on a judicial decision 
or arbitral award), even if it is not in conformity with EU law.57  
By contrast, AG Trstenjak had argued that – in light of the aim of the UCTD to protect 
consumers and the obligation of the Member States to effectively guarantee the rights 
granted to individuals by EU law – the national court must always have the power of ex 
officio control.58 She pointed out that the consumer could not be expected to take part 
in invalid arbitration proceedings based on an unfair arbitration clause, in order to 
have the clause annulled. In this respect, the AG referred to Article 47 EUCFR and the 
right to be heard.59 This right must be guaranteed in all proceedings initiated against a 
person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, 
including arbitral proceedings.60 The AG also questioned whether arbitrators can be 
regarded as independent and neutral when the arbitration clause has been drafted by 
the same institute that is entrusted with the arbitration proceedings.61 Independence 
presupposes that the tribunal is protected against external interventions or pressure 
liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their 
decisions.62  
The Opinion of AG Trstenjak shows how Asturcom could have had a different outcome 
if it had been framed as an issue of effective judicial protection, in particular the rights 
of the defence. The question is whether the consumer, as a defendant, can be 
expected to bring annulment proceedings against an arbitral award rendered by e.g. e-
                                                          
54  The referring court in Asturcom ultimately gave an enforcement order (Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 4 de 
Bilbao, order of 26 October 2009; not published). See also Chantal Mak, ‘Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) 
of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, Case C-40/08’ [2010] 
European Review of Contract Law 437, 447.  
55  Asturcom, paras 46-47. 
56  Asturcom, para 41.  
57  See e.g. Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v Benetton International ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, para 48.  
58  Opinion AG Trstenjak, points 58-59.  
59  Ibid, points 64 and 61 respectively.  
60  Cf. Case C-277/11 M.M. v Ministry for Justice, Equality and Law Reform ECLI:EU:C:2012:744 
para. 82, C-300/11 Z.Z. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2013:363 paras. 55 and 
57.  
61  Opinion AG Trstenjak, point 66.  
62  C-64/16 Associaçao Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para 44, referring 
to inter alia Margarit Panicello, para 37.  
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Court at all.63 There are other reasons than inertia that may cause consumers “to 
forego any legal remedy or defence”.64 Various factors can deter them from pursuing 
their claims or defending their rights, e.g. a lack of information, financial risks and/or 
low amounts in dispute.65 When consumers are confronted with an arbitral award, 
albeit based on an unfair arbitration clause, they may be pressured into paying instead 
of challenging the award in court.66 It could be argued that, if there is no (or only 
limited) judicial control, traders can actually deprive consumers of the protection 
intended by the UCTD, read in conjunction with Article 47 EUCFR, simply by initiating 
arbitration proceedings.67  
4. A closer look at Article 47 EUCFR 
Since 2009, Article 47 EUCFR is a mandatory requirement that is binding on national 
(civil) courts when they decide cases under the UCTD.68 It has been referred to in cases 
concerning e.g. order for payment procedures69 and the (extrajudicial) enforcement of 
charges and mortgages.70 What these cases have in common with Asturcom, is that 
they raise the question how the effective judicial protection of consumers can be 
ensured if the courts are side-lined. National (civil) courts also play a key role in the 
enforcement and protection of substantive (EU) rights. While there may be other ways 
to achieve a high level of consumer protection,71 courts may be viewed as a last resort 
to provide a remedy against violations of those rights. At the same time, the debate 
about e-Court raises questions as to the deficiencies of the judicial system – e.g. costs 
and length of the proceedings – that makes parties resort to ADR mechanisms. 
The right of access to court is not absolute. It may be restricted, provided that the 
restrictions pursue objectives of general interest and do not involve a disproportionate 
interference with the very essence of the right (cf. Article 52(1) EUCFR).72 The test 
                                                          
63  Hanna Schebesta, ‘Does the National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio Application after 
Asturcom’ [2010] European Review of Private Law 847, 862. 
64  Case C-137/08 Pénzügyi Lízing v Schneider, para 54; Océano, para 22.  
65  Marco Loos, ‘Access to Justice in Consumer Law’ (2015) 36 Recht der Werkelijkheid 113.  
66  Cf. Case C-503/15 Margarit Panicello, Opinion of AG Kokott ECLI:EU:C:2017:126, point 171.  
67  See, with respect to mortgage enforcement proceedings, Aziz, para 62; Joined Cases C-537/12 and C-116/13 
Banco Popular Español v Rivas Quichimbo ECLI:EU:C::2013:759, para 60; Sánchez Morcillo, para 28; C-32/14 
ERSTE Bank Hungary v Sugár, para 45.  
68  Banif Plus Bank, para 29; Sánchez Morcillo, para 35; Case C-34/13 Kušionová v SMART Capital 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189, para 47.  
69  Case C-49/14 Finanmadrid EFC SA v Albán Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2016:98; Case C-503/15 Margarit Panicello v 
Hernández Martínez ECLI:EU:C:2017:126.  
70  Kušionová; Sánchez Morcillo.  
71  In this respect, there is a difference between effective legal protection (cf. Article 19 of the Treaty on European 
Union) and effective judicial protection, and between access to justice and access to court.  
72  See further Sacha Prechal, ‘The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter 
Changed?’ in C Paulussen and others (eds), Fundamental rights in international and European law: public and 
private law perspectives (TMC Asser Press 2015) 151. 
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under Article 47 EUCFR is pertinent to the individual right to actual ‘judicial control’, 
rather than the limits of Member State procedural autonomy under the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness.73 In Alassini, which concerned four civil suits against 
Italian telephone service providers, the CJEU balanced the right of access to court 
(Article 47 ECUFR) against objectives of general interest, i.e. facilitating the quicker and 
less expensive settlement of disputes and lightening the burden on the court system.74 
The CJEU adopted a similar reasoning in another Italian case: Menini (2017). The 
Consumer ADR Directive75 does not preclude mediation as a mandatory preliminary 
step, as long as it does not prevent the parties from exercising their right of access to 
the judicial system. The CJEU based this conclusion on the principle of effective judicial 
protection – with reference to Alassini76 – and the Directive itself,77 which explicitly 
refers to Article 47 EUCFR.78  
Alassini and Menini show that ADR can strengthen the effectiveness of consumer 
protection, where it offers a simple, fast and low-cost out-of-court solution to disputes 
between consumers and traders.79 This may justify a limitation of the rights laid down 
in Article 47 EUCFR. In this respect, there is a difference between mediation and 
arbitration; the latter has a more adjudicative function, to the exclusion of the court’s 
jurisdiction.80 The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) has 
recognized that it is contrary to the right to effective judicial protection to prescribe 
arbitration as the default route, because the essence of arbitration is the free will and 
autonomy of the parties.81 As regards arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, it is 
dubious whether this ‘free will’ can be presupposed. In the context of the UCTD, 
                                                          
73  Cf. Case C-61/14 Orrizonte Salute v Ministero della Giustizia, Opinion of AG Jääskinen ECLI:EU:C:2015:307, point 
37.  
74  Joined Cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08 Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA ECLI:EU:C:2010:146, 
paras 63-64.  
75  Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes. 
76  Menini, paras 55 and 61. 
77  Article 1 reads: “The purpose of this Directive is, through the achievement of a high level of consumer 
protection, to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by ensuring that consumers can, on a 
voluntary basis, submit complaints against traders to entities offering independent, impartial, transparent, 
effective, fast and fair alternative dispute resolution procedures. This Directive is without prejudice to national 
legislation making participation in such procedures mandatory, provided that such legislation does not prevent 
the parties from exercising their right of access to the judicial system.” 
78  Recital 45 reads: “The right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial are fundamental rights laid down 
in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Therefore, ADR procedures should 
not be designed to replace court procedures and should not deprive consumers or traders of their rights to seek 
redress before the courts. This Directive should not prevent parties from exercising their right of access to the 
judicial system. (…)”  
79  Consumer ADR Directive, recital 5.  
80  Schebesta (n 57) 870. See also Andrea Fejős and Chris Willett, ‘Consumer Access to Justice: The Role of the ADR 
Directive and the Member States’ (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 33; Lorna McGregor, ‘Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a Rights-Based Approach through the ECHR’ (2015) 26 
European Journal of International Law 607. 
81  Tribunal Constitutional, decision No. 185/1987 of 18 November 1987, ECLI:ES:TC:1987:185; decision No. 
174/1995 of 23 November 1995, ECLI:ES:TC:1995:174; decision No. 352/2006 of 14 December 2006, 
ECLI:ES:TC:2006:352. 
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therefore, it appears to be more difficult to justify a restriction of the consumer’s right 
to effective judicial protection.  
In Asturcom, the CJEU did not consider if and when consumer arbitration might 
constitute an unjustified infringement of Article 47 EUCFR. It has been observed that 
the CJEU’s hesitation to interfere in national procedural law and arbitration seems to 
overshadow its pursuit of a high level of consumer protection, perhaps due to the 
politically sensitive nature.82 In Slovak Republic v Achmea (2018), a (non-consumer) 
case concerning arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty, the CJEU was bolder. It 
held that insofar as an arbitral tribunal that is not a court or tribunal of a Member 
State and thus not part of the judicial system may be called on to interpret or to apply 
EU law, its awards must be subject to judicial review (in order to ensure that questions 
of EU law which the tribunal may have to address can be submitted to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling).83 The CJEU recalled that in relation to commercial arbitration, the 
requirements of efficient arbitration proceedings may justify the judicial review of 
arbitral awards being limited in scope, provided that the fundamental provisions of EU 
law can be examined in the course of that review.84 The CJEU does not clarify the 
relation between “fundamental provisions of EU law” and “public policy” in the 
context of the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that fundamental rights, such as Article 47 EUCFR, are part of (or 
equivalent to) public policy within the EU.85 On the other hand, Article 47 EUCFR could 
also be seen as an additional requirement that does not ‘override’ (domestic) public 
policy, but creates space for more judicial control, at least in the context of the 
UCTD.86 For the purposes of this paper, a parallel could be drawn with Achmea to the 
extent that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts do not always originate in the 
freely expressed wishes of both parties and remove disputes which may concern the 
application or interpretation of EU law from the jurisdiction of the courts.87 This 
warrants a more extensive judicial review of arbitral awards in consumer cases, in any 
case a check of the (in)validity of the underlying arbitration clause: if it is ‘blacklisted’, 
it should not be enforced.   
 
                                                          
82  Mak (n 49) 438, 443; Schebesta (n 57) 871.  
83  Achmea, paras 42 and 50.  
84  Achmea, para 54, referring to Eco Swiss, paras 35,36 and 40 and Mostaza Claro, paras 34-39.  
85  See e.g. Vicente Pérez Daudí, La Protección Procesal Del Consumidor y El Orden Público Comunitario (Atelier 
2018) 134.  
86  The recognition and enforcement of (domestic) arbitral awards against consumers cannot be put on a par with 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, where using ‘fair trial’ as a European yardstick may 
create problems: see Monique Hazelhorst, Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European Union and the 
Right to a Fair Trial (TMC Asser Press 2017) 292. 
87  Achmea, para 55.  
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5. Conclusion 
The example of e-Court in the Netherlands illustrates that ADR can undermine the 
effective judicial protection of consumers, which goes beyond ex officio control of 
unfair terms and also extends to essential procedural preconditions, e.g. the right to 
be heard. In this respect, Article 47 EUCFR may set a higher threshold than the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness (cf. Asturcom). The mere fact that an 
arbitral award has obtained res judicata effect should not make it practically immune 
from judicial review.88 Of course, this does not mean that the trader’s rights (e.g. to 
repayment of a debt) are entirely disregarded. There is no one-on-one relationship 
between an improvement of the consumer’s procedural protection and a deterioration 
of the trader’s position from a substantive point of view.89 On the contrary, traders still 
have access to the court system as claimants and in the Netherlands also to 
arbitration, as long as certain (procedural) requirements are observed. If this is not the 
case or cannot be determined, then it is defensible that the court should refuse to 
enforce the arbitral award, even if national procedural law does not provide an express 
statutory basis for that. It remains to be seen how the Dutch judiciary will deal with 
arbitral awards rendered by e-Court; no requests for enforcement have been filed 
lately.  
There are still considerable disparities between national legal systems in terms of 
substantive and procedural modalities, as a comparison between the Netherlands and 
Spain demonstrates. Article 47 EUCFR is subject to interpretation; it leaves choices to 
be made with regard to the measures that can be taken.90 Securing effective judicial 
protection should be done first at the legislative level, but the practical 
implementation as well as a correction of the legislature’s errors or omissions takes 
place at the level of the judiciary.91 As the example of e-Court shows, the existence of 
‘protective’ legislation does not guarantee its observance in practice. It is submitted 
that Article 47 ECUFR could help to fill a gap between (EU) rights and (national) 
remedies and procedures for the enforcement and protection of those rights.92 
                                                          
88  Cf. Opinion AG Trstenjak in Asturcom, point 75; Finanmadrid, para 51.  
89  Folkert Wilman, ‘The Vigilance of Individuals: How, When and Why the EU Legislates to 
Facilitate the Private Enforcement of EU Law before National Courts’ (Leiden University 2014) 496.  
90  Cf. Malu Beijer, ‘Active Guidance of Fundamental Rights Protection by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union: Exploring the Possibilities of a Positive Obligations Doctrine’ (2015) 8 Review of 
European administrative law 127, 145. 
91  Cf. Nina Półtorak, European Union Rights in National Courts (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 150; Fabrizio 
Cafaggi and Paola Iamiceli, ‘The Principles of Effectiveness, Proportionality and Dissuasiveness in the 
Enforcement of EU Consumer Law: The Impact of a Triad on the Choice of Civil Remedies and 
Administrative Sanctions’ (2017) 25 European Review of Private Law 575, 580.  
92  Cf. Norbert Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law (Intersentia 2014) 99. About a ‘civil justice gap’ in respect of 
consumer rights: Benöhr (n 13) 177; Stefan Wrbka, European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 33. See also European Commission, Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and 
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It provides civil courts with an instrument for the assessment, (consistent) 
interpretation and (dis)application of both contractual clauses and procedural rules, as 
long as the case falls within the scope of EU law (Article 51(2) EUCFR). As such, the 
‘proceduralized constitutionalization’93 of consumer protection may entail a change in 
perspective, from deference to national law and domestic public policy to an ‘EU 
standard’ that empowers national (civil) courts in their capacity of ‘decentralized’ EU-
judges.  
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